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Introduction 
Since 2009, the internationalisation of the Chinese yuan, or the renminbi, has become 
an increasingly important subject in the economics of China.  On the surface, 
internationalisation of the renminbi means the currency is used as a unit of account, 
medium of exchange, and store of value in international trade and financial 
transactions.  Beneath the surface, it means that non-Chinese residents hold renminbi-
denominated assets and liabilities, both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet.  Seen 
from this perspective, the analytical questions in understanding the process of 
renminbi internationalisation include at least the following:  Why do non-Chinese 
residents have incentives to hold renminbi-denominated assets and liabilities?  How 
do non-Chinese residents acquire renminbi-denominated assets and liabilities?  Does 
this not require convertibility of the renminbi under the capital account of the balance 
of payments?  What are the roles of official policies and market forces in driving the 
process of renminbi internationalisation? 
 
At the outset, it is useful to dispel the popular notion that China cannot possibly 
internationalise its currency or become a reserve currency issuing country because it 
runs current account surpluses.  This argument is predicated on the assumption that a 
country can only supply its currency for international use by running current account 
deficits.  However, a country can also supply its currency for international use 
through the capital account.  In effect, a reserve currency country plays the role of a 
bank to the rest of the world: it provides a liquidity service by issuing short-term 
liabilities that non-residents would use for international trade and investment, and it 
also invests in other countries, perhaps in less liquid forms, such as foreign direct 
investments.  In other words, issuing reserve currency is a process of financial 
intermediation through the international balance sheet of the reserve currency country.  
Historically, Great Britain and United States gained reserve currency status while 
running current account surpluses. 
 
The context 
Renminbi internationalisation was put on the policy agenda by the Chinese authorities 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.  As banks scrambled for 
liquidity, US dollar funding markets and foreign exchange swap markets seized up in 
late 2008.  The resulting “dollar shortage” threatened to stifle international trade.  
This experience has highlighted the danger of relying excessively on one reserve 
currency in international trade and payments, and the possible benefits of using a 
wider array of currencies, including emerging market currencies, especially in 
transactions between emerging markets (Zhou, (2012)).   
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More broadly, the spread of the trans-Atlantic financial crisis globally was seen as an 
intrinsic defect of the international monetary system, where domestic policy 
objectives of the major reserve currency country override its obligations to maintain 
global monetary and financial stability.  A more diversified system to supply global 
liquidity can be seen as an interim solution before the arrival of a truly super-national 
reserve currency (Zhou, (2009)). 
 
The role of official policies 
Whether or not a currency is used extensively for international transactions is 
primarily determined by market forces.  Seen in this light, renminbi 
internationalisation is more a process of dismantling extant restrictions against its 
international use.  Since mid-2009, the Chinese authorities have moved quickly to 
remove restrictions against the use of renminbi in current account transactions, and 
have gradually expanded the scope for the use of renminbi in capital account 
transactions. 
 
The major challenge in managing the process is to delineate the relationship between 
currency internationalisation and capital account liberalisation.  While it is commonly 
taken for granted that capital account convertibility is a pre-requisite for currency 
internationalisation, the Chinese authorities have argued that currency 
internationalisation and capital account liberalisation should be mutually-reinforcing 
processes (Zhou (2012)).  Currency internationalisation is seen as an integral 
component of the broad financial sector reform and development agenda, and can be 
made consistent with the “proactive, gradualist, and controllable” approach to capital 
account liberalisation. 
 
As a bare minimum, international use of the domestic currency requires that offshore 
banks need to be able to keep and have access to clearing balances with onshore 
banks.  In other words, some degree of non-resident convertibility of the renminbi has 
to be granted to offshore banks.  Before July 2009, offshore banks generally could not 
maintain and have access to renminbi balances kept with onshore banks.  With the 
launch of pilot scheme of renminbi trade settlement in July 2009, overseas banks 
could open correspondent accounts with banks inside China.  From August 2010 
onwards overseas nonbank institutions accepting payments for exports to China in 
renminbi can deposit the proceeds from such transactions on accounts with banks 
inside China.   
 
Once cross-border payment flows in renminbi are made possible, non-residents would 
need the means to acquire renminbi assets and liabilities.  The Chinese authorities 
allowed the settlement of current account balances as the first major source and use of 
renminbi funds: payment by onshore firms for imports from overseas would be 
sources of renminbi funds for non-residents, and payment by offshore firms for 
imports from China would be uses of renminbi funds by non-residents.  Before the 
launch of the pilot scheme of renminbi trade settlement in July 2009, no firm in China 
could use the renminbi to settle payments with overseas counterparties.  Under the 
pilot scheme, 365 firms were included in the list of firms eligible to choose to the 
renminbi for trade settlement.  A year later, in June 2010, coverage of the pilot 
scheme was expanded to 20 provinces, allowing all firms in those provinces to settle 
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imports and services trade in renminbi, and more than 60,000 firms to settle exports of 
goods in renminbi.  In August 2011, coverage of the scheme expanded further to all 
provinces; and finally in June 2012, all current account transactions by all Mainland 
firms could now be invoiced and settled in renminbi.   
 
The Chinese authorities also expanded gradually the scope of using renminbi to 
acquire assets and liabilities by non-residents through direct and portfolio 
investments.  In August 2010, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) announced a pilot 
scheme for eligible offshore financial institutions involved in renminbi trade 
settlement to make use of their renminbi funds to invest in the onshore interbank bond 
market.  In January 2011 and October 2011, administrative rules for the use of 
renminbi by Chinese enterprises to conduct overseas direct investments, and 
administrative rules for conducting foreign direct investments in China by foreign 
firms in renminbi were promulgated, respectively.  A further channel of portfolio 
flows in renminbi was opened up when the so-called renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (R-QFII) scheme was announced in December 2011, under 
which Hong Kong-based brokerage firms could offer to non-Chinese residents 
renminbi investment products, subject to an aggregate quota, that are invested in 
onshore bond and stock markets. 
 
To support the international use of the renminbi and to provide a contingent source of 
liquidity, the PBoC has also set up bilateral local currency swap facilities with 
overseas central banks and monetary authorities.  By June 2012, 18 agreements for 
such facilities have been assigned, with the total amount reaching RMB1.6 trillion. 
 
Incentives 
Market forces have responded quickly to official policies.  According to the PBoC 
statistics, 6.6 percent of China’s merchandise trade in 2011 was settled in renminbi, a 
sharp rise from two percent in 2010.  In 2011, foreign investors settled 10.8 percent of 
their direct investments in China in renminbi, and Chinese investors settled 4.1 
percent of their direct investments overseas in renminbi.  At the same time, non-
Chinese residents’ holdings of renminbi deposits and bonds also grew rapidly.  
Renminbi customer deposits of Hong Kong banks increased from RMB315 billion 
yuan at end-2010 to RMB588 billion yuan at end-2011.  According to BIS 
international securities data, renminbi offshore bonds outstanding at end-2011 
amounted to some RMB320 billion yuan.  
 
Non-Chinese residents have strong incentives to increase their exposure to renminbi 
assets and liabilities because the starting positions are in all likelihood significantly 
below their desired or optimal portfolio allocations into the renminbi.  And such 
optimal allocations are likely to grow with the increasing weight of the Chinese 
economy in global production and trade.  Some critics, such as Garber (2011), have 
taken one-way speculative positioning due to strong renminbi appreciation 
expectations as the main impetus for international use of the renminbi.  However, the 
underlying incentive to increase exposure to renminbi assets and liabilities by non-
Chinese residents is likely to remain strong, not easily reversed by cyclical 
fluctuations in exchange rate expectations. 
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From the Chinese residents’ point of view, internationalising the renminbi can be 
expected to help to reduce currency mismatch of China’s international balance sheet.  
Because of both current account surpluses and capital inflows, on the one hand, and 
the controls and the consequent lack of internationalisation of the renminbi, on the 
other, Chinese residents bears all the risk of an appreciation.  Denominating China’s 
claims on the rest of the world, or allowing non-residents to borrow, in renminbi 
would reduce this currency exposure (Cheung et al (2011)).  Offshore renminbi bond 
markets would allow governments and firms outside of China to borrow in renminbi 
and thereby allow Chinese life insurers and pension funds to diversify credit while 
matching renminbi liabilities. 
 
The role of offshore markets 
Judging from the experience of the US dollar and other major reserve currencies, 
currency internationalisation is accompanied by the development of offshore markets 
of that currency.  As He and McCauley (2010) have argued, offshore markets perform 
essential economic functions, including separation of currency and country risks and 
the diversification of operational risks.   
 
Hong Kong was the first place outside Mainland China to have renminbi banking, 
supported by a clearing arrangement provided by the PBoC.  Since 2004, Hong Kong 
has progressively developed into a renminbi offshore centre, with the scope of its 
renminbi banking business expanding from personal deposits, to bonds, to trade credit 
and project financing, and to interbank trading.  Since July 2010, Hong Kong has 
produced a second set of spot and forward exchange rates for the renminbi, dubbed 
the CNH, for delivery of renminbi against dollars outside Mainland China.  A second 
set of renminbi yield curves has also been formed in Hong Kong with the active 
issuance of bonds by the Chinese Ministry of Finance and firms from both inside and 
outside China.  These offshore renminbi exchange and interest rates have retained a 
spread over but have tended to move in tandem with onshore rates. 
 
At present, the renminbi balance sheet of banks in Hong Kong serves as a conduit for 
net renminbi lending from the rest of the world to the mainland.  Renminbi bonds 
issued by non-banks and held outside the banking system tend also to result in a net 
renminbi claim of the rest of the world on China.  However, as the expected path of 
the renminbi exchange rate shows much less consistent appreciation, non-resident 
borrowing in the renminbi looks to be less discouraged by one-way expectations on 
the exchange rate.  Indeed, loans and advances in renminbi booked by Hong Kong 
banks grew rapidly in the first half of 2012.  In this case, the renminbi offshore market 
in Hong Kong (and in other financial centres) can be expected to evolve along the 
paths of the other types of offshore markets (He and McCauley (2012)).  Over time, 
the renminbi offshore market is likely to play above all the role of intermediary 
between non-mainland Chinese borrowers and lenders. 
 
Prospects 
The experience since 2009 shows that facilitating the internationalisation of the 
renminbi requires a deliberate pace of institutional reforms and policy liberalisation, 
which in turn would be conducive to a more open and market-based financial system 
in China.  In the long run, the status of the renminbi as an international currency will 
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depend on the size of the Chinese economy and the sophistication of renminbi 
financial markets.  As long as Chinese economy keeps a fast pace of growth and 
further integrates with the global community, the prospect of the renminbi is bright.   
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